Christopher Quick v. Township of Bernards by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-30-2018 
Christopher Quick v. Township of Bernards 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Christopher Quick v. Township of Bernards" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 406. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/406 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2808 
_____________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER QUICK;  
LORETTA QUICK, 
Appellant 
                              
v. 
 
TOWNSHIP OF BERNARDS; 
BERNARDS TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE; 
BERNARDS TOWNSHIP PLANNING BOARD 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
District of New Jersey 
(Civ. Action No. 3-17-cv-05595) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 19, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 30, 2018) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION∗  
_____________ 
                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Christopher and Loretta Quick appeal the denial of their motion to preliminarily 
enjoin a public hearing of the Bernards Township Planning Board (the “Board”) that 
occurred on August 8, 2017.  We will dismiss the appeal as moot.   
I. 
Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts.  The Quicks 
live in Bernards Township, New Jersey.  At the August 8 hearing, the Board weighed a 
proposal to build a mosque near the Quicks’ home.  The rules governing the August 8 
hearing, which were outlined in a settlement agreement reached in a related lawsuit, 
directed that “[n]o commentary regarding Islam or Muslims [would] be permitted” at the 
hearing.1  The settlement agreement further provided that “[i]n no event shall the 
proceedings extend beyond one (1) single . . . hearing.”2    
The Quicks wanted to address the Board at the August 8 hearing.  However, the 
Quicks feared “adverse legal consequences” if they violated the above commentary 
prohibition.3  Based on these concerns, the Quicks moved to preliminarily enjoin the 
hearing on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 
On August 8, 2017, the District Court held a hearing on the Quicks’ preliminary 
injunction motion.  At the end of the hearing, the District Court denied preliminary 
injunctive relief, reasoning that the Quicks failed to show a likelihood of success on the 
                                              
1 JA 57. 
2 JA 55. 
3 JA 31. 
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merits.  Later that day, the August 8 hearing went forward and the Board approved 
construction of a mosque near the Quicks’ home.  This appeal followed.   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  While the 
denial of a preliminary injunction is normally appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), 
“[i]f developments occur” that “prevent a court from being able to grant the requested 
relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”4  In this regard, it is settled that “when the 
event sought to be enjoined in a preliminary injunction has occurred, an appeal from the 
order denying the preliminary injunction is moot.”5  It is undisputed that the August 8 
hearing that the Quicks sought to enjoin has already occurred.  As such, their appeal is 
moot and we lack jurisdiction to consider it.6 
In response, the Quicks contend that this case satisfies the “capable of repetition, 
yet evading review” exception to mootness.  This argument fails.  That exception applies 
only where “there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be 
subject to the same action again.”7  Here, the Quicks have no expectation—let alone a 
reasonable one—that the Board will hold another public hearing because the settlement 
agreement expressly provided that there would be only one hearing on the proposed site 
                                              
4 Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996). 
5 Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1991).   
6 See Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that “mootness is a 
jurisdictional issue”). 
7 Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (quoting 
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (brackets omitted)).   
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plan.  Further, even if there is another hearing, it is not clear that the commentary 
prohibition in question would apply.8 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal as moot. 
                                              
8 On appeal, the Quicks also ask that the Board’s decision at the August 8 hearing be 
vacated.  However, because they did not seek such relief from the District Court, that 
request is waived.  See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not consider issues raised for 
the first time on appeal.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
